general

Its been a little while since I’ve been able to work on any of my various projects but I do plan to finish and release a couple of them soon. In the meantime I’ll be at Def Con so hit me up if anyone wants to meet up.

Hilariously rcrypt 1.5 still bypasses every AV out there (yup that includes KAV) but I assume thats mainly because 1.5 hasn’t been released outside of the web portal. The day or day after I release the stand alone 1.5 binary it will be detected! I might do this eventually but only just before another interesting release ;]

Hold onto ur panties kids.

Happy [after] April Fools!

I was wondering how long I’d let my site be “defaced” but then decided the novelty wore off pretty quickly (especially since the layout looked even better! ha). It was enjoyable watching a crap load of people download the dumped source to rcrypt. If you compile and run it you’ll enjoy a nice lil surprise. If you didn’t do this already, well, you should have =]

Anyway if you want to check out the defaced site feel free to click [april fools].

There will be a new tool coming soon. I’ve been super swamped with work and find almost no time these days for my own personal projects which is a bit depressing. I will continue to code but my free time seems to be dwindling. I hope to have this next tool released sometime soon.

I’ve finally released rcrypt 1.5 via a newly launched website over at (http://rcrypt.0xrage.com). Not only is rcrypt 1.5 available there but some other classic packers as well! The purpose of this site is to allow users to play with various packers without having to mess around with the packer binaries themselves. Not everyone wants to run a random exe and feel safe afterwards. As for me, I triple click all exes especially from emails from people I’ve never spoken to before!

In anycase rcrypt 1.5 is available to all users of the website and as an added bonus I’ll be creating custom ones for users who are interested and making them available to them via the rcrypt web frontend website. This makes it easier for me and hopefully the user as well.

If anyone wants to contribute their own packers or just any packer please contact me and I’ll be happy to add it to the list! There are only a few currently in the system but as time goes on I will add support for more.

 

rcrypt 1.5

rcrypt 1.5

 

For users of the command line versions of rcrypt there have always been easter eggs built into the binary. Since noone has actually bothered to look I will simply share one of them now!

rcrypt.exe [your binary] -h4x

This of course works with the optional parameters as well.

Have fun!

After making rcrypt public it almost immediately became detected. This is not surprising as when something like this becomes more public it will also become detected. Whats important to realize is rcrypt 1.4, being the current released version, is detected but the in progress (fully functional) 1.5 remains undetected.

oh n0ez

oh n0ez

 

Now does this mean I will rush out and release 1.5? Well not exactly. I want to make clear the types of detection there are and the kinds of things you can do about it. There seems to be no end to incorrect information and lack of understanding so I am hoping to address at least some of that now.

There are two primary methods of detecting binaries employed by AVs.

  • signature detection
  • dynamic detection

The first method is the oldest and least useful. It requires the ability to detect known static patterns in a binary to function. The second one however is far more powerful.

Signature detection is barely more technical than grepping for byte sequences. Perhaps more advanced types have a sort of error tolerance but otherwise this is trivially bypassed by slight modifications in code.

Dynamic detection completely defeats code modification because this form of detection simply executes binaries in a sandbox and observes behavior. This is the important part that I think people don’t seem to understand.

When people try to evade AVs I see techniques employed such as:

  • leetsauce METASM ninja
  • leetsauce polymorphic stuff
  • and more recently leetsauce shellcode injection into random PEs

These techniques are ALL excellent however they all bypass signature detection ONLY. They are absolutely useless against sandbox analysis. Anytime I read somewhere techniques for making msf payloads or random other payloads undetected I see people talk about projects that will, in a nutshell, modify their shellcode in some way.

I’m not knocking any of these techniques as they are all interesting and do something cool. However they don’t address the goal of evading the two main AV detection mechanisms. Another thing I’ve noticed, and I could be wrong, is that these techniques and tools don’t work on binaries at all. They only work on shellcode. This, for me, is useless.

The aim of rcrypt is to show how sandbox analysis can be defeated by, in this case, timing out the analysis engine. So how, you ask, is 1.4 detected? Seeing as how it completely defeats the strongest method of detection, sandbox analysis, it means that the detection is merely a signature match. Which means changing 1 or 2 bytes is all thats necessary to evade this weak detection (nice job KAV). The fact that 1.5 without any changes defeats this shows that the detection is quite weak and trivial to evade.

I won’t go into just how to perform these modifications as I trust that if you understand you can perform these modifications yourself. The fact is that rcrypt has, as of now, completely defeated the strong detection option and evading trivial signature matches is simply a function of swapping bytes around.

I have a couple new projects in the works that might get a public release (maybe one of them) as it seems like something that could be useful to the general public. New linux projects, new windows projects, and maybe new android projects too! A new year needs some new things and hopefully I’ll get enough time to myself to allow for some of these to see the light of day!

On a side note the reason I haven’t released rcrypt 1.5 officially is because there is literally no feature difference between it and 1.4 with the exception of 2 things.

1) rcrypt now evades AVG

2) i fixed a relocation miscalculation that causes relocation to fail if it is required (could definitely happen on occasion).

Until I add an actual valid new feature I probably won’t release 1.5 but we’ll see.

EDIT:

Turns out rcrypt didn’t work on Win8. This has been fixed in the unreleased rcrypt 1.5 as well lol. Still holding off releasing until something new is ready though ;]

3) rcrypt works on win8

Version 1.4 adds support for eof data. I hadn’t realized until someone commented but rcrypt destroyed any extraneous data which caused issues with any binaries that made use of this data. This has since been fixed!

MD5 Sum: 40fba75715011b13fd4521163151dbb9
SHA1 Sum: c95dc3708ba8ffafb37e21d5f12b635806fd4a00
Download: rcrypt 1.4

archive pw: 0xrage.com

This is a writeup I did about rcrypt a few months back in PDF format for those interested in how rcrypt works. In addition to some general information this writeup shows some reverse engineering analysis and a test case given a sample of known malware in the context of AV evasion. Fun for the whole family!

File: rcrypt writeup

MD5 Sum: 10c73cc7f922c7baea6d33c35180d19a

SHA1 Sum: c05775934ab46c69bb53164a7c3fca3d9ec75b15

 

 

So I’ve been interested in the chromecast device since I had heard of it a while back and finally got around to ordering one. For $35 before shipping its not bad, even if its just to play with briefly.

Mine finally arrived today! I am going to share some very quick things I’ve discovered about this nifty little device.

Let me first start off by mentioning that I have NOT gotten this device to successfully connect to my wireless network. Part of the reason I even investigated this (and thus decided to share some of my findings here) are due to being unable to get this sweet little device onto my wifi network. That being said I think looking under the hood allows us to peer into how Google designed this device and how it works!

So step 1? Plug the thing into a power source and stick it into one of my TVs many HDMI ports and see what comes up!

The first thing that comes up is a welcome screen showing you the name of the device which is always ChromecastXXXX where the Xs are four randomly generated numbers. At this point I downloaded the android app and proceeded with the configuration which allowed me to do the following things:

1. detect my chromecastXXX device
2. configure it to connect to my wifi network
3. connect to it via my wifi network for the main functionality provided it can now connect to my wifi network.

It was step 3 that kept failing no matter how many times I tried (and rebooted the device) so I decided to see exactly how this setup process worked.

So I grabbed one of my smaller laptops (this one) and decided to try the “manual setup” which is decribed at (https://cast.google.com/chromecast/setup?np=manualsetup).

So how does step 1 work? How was my app able to detect the presence of my ChromecastXXXX device? I assumed it was bluetooth and that configuration occured over a paired bluetooth channel. As it turns out that is not the case. It’s actually good old wifi!

chromecast_ap

So step one in the manual setup process is to connect to the wireless network with the SSID that represents your device name. In the case where I actually took note of this my device SSID was Chromecast8991.

So the little thing starts up an AP and lets you configure it somewhat like a router! Cool. So I connected to this AP and requested an IP address with dhclient. After [forever] I got one.

I got an IP of 192.168.255.250 and the device itself turned out to be 192.168.255.249. Of course the first thing I did was check for open ports. The following ports were open:

53 (non working DNS)
8008 (main communications)

As soon as you connect to the device as a client it will give you a random 4 digit code on screen which I imagine is used for further communications in the case someone else decides to connect to your unencrypted and open device SSID. It will prevent someone unable to see your TV screen to configure your device but thats about it. Once I get this thing working I will take a look at sniffing network traffic to see if I can “cross the streams” on other people’s chromecasts so to speak. Would be hilarious.

chromecast_connected_to_ap

Anyway once you get this code the first step in the configuration begins. All communication with the device at this point is done over json encoded data over HTTP.

The next phase involves telling the device to scan for wireless networks so you can tell it which to connect to and with what security mechanisms. The network traffic looks like this:

GET /setup/eureka_info HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.255.249:8008
Connection: keep-alive

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
Cache-Control: no-cache
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://cast.google.com
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 852

{“build_version”:”12072″,”connected”:false,”has_update”:false,”hdmi_control”:true,”hotspot_bssid”:”FA:8F:XX:XX:XX:XX”,”locale”:
“en_US”,”mac_address”:”D0:E7:XX:XX:XX:XX”,”name”:”Chromecast8991″,”opt_in”:{“crash”:true,”device_id”:false,”stats”:true},”publi
c_key”:”MIIBCgKCAQEAyoaWlKNT6W5+/cJXEpIfeGvogtJ1DghEUs2PmHkX3n4bByfmMRDYjuhcb97vd8N3HFe5sld6QSc+FJz7TSGp/700e6nrkbGj9abwvobey/I
rLbHTPLtPy/ceUnwmAXczkhay32auKTaM5ZYjwcHZkaU9XuOQVIPpyLF1yQerFChugCpQ+bvIoJnTkoZAuV1A1Vp4qf3nn4Ll9Bi0R4HJrGNmOKUEjKP7H1aCLSqj13
FgJ2s2g20CCD8307Otq8n5fR+9/c01dtKgQacupysA+4LVyk4npFn5cXlzkkNPadcKskARtb9COTP2jBWcowDwjKSBokAgi/es/5gDhZm4dwIDAQAB”,”release_tr
ack”:”stable-channel”,”setup_state”:11,”ssdp_udn”:”82c5cb87-27b4-2a9a-d4e1-5811f2b1992c”,”ssid”:””,”uma_client_id”:”4DE23B6E-B2
B0-7DBC-7BFB-F29D84AF87EF”,”uptime”:83.5,”version”:4,”wpa_configured”:false,”wpa_state”:3};,`* cSc52{zerogoki7w,/y*;,`* cSc52{z
erogoki7w,/y*GET /setup/eureka_info HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.255.249:8008

Based on the traffic you can see that the /setup/eureka_info URL is used to request the initial scan/results. You can also see various information about the bssid/ssid as well as some of its current configuration, the hostname of the system connected to it, and a bunch of IDs. Also that I’ve somehow opted into sending Google information when there is a crash as well as for stats is noted. Fun. You can see that there seems to be public key crypto which is good if we’re going to be sending our wifi network details over an open and unencrypted wireless network.

I did notice during the multiple times I’ve tried to connect this to my wireless network that the public key changes so it is generated by the device and not hardcoded (which is just fine). What I did find very interesting is that this very request the last couple of times included GPS data which means this device has GPS????? Here is a snippet of a previous response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
Cache-Control: no-cache
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://cast.google.com
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 998

{“build_version”:”12072″,”connected”:false,”has_update”:false,”hdmi_control”:true,”hotspot_bssid”:”FA:8F:XX:XX:XX:XX”,”locale”:”en_US”,”location”:{“latitude”:39.XXXXXX,”longitude”:-76.XXXXXXX},”mac_address”:”D0:E7:XX:XX:XX:XX”,”name”:”Chromecast6603″,”noise_level”:-84,”opt_in”:{“crash”:true,”device_id”:false,”stats”:true},”public_key”:”MIIBCgKCAQEA1eq2miUMleKr/vjbb/3cd3rMkSZG0PnerBYpAjkHPA02FM8OCoMe+OIV0t6OJ3BFNnf3nJLThSw/ckQ+h6CpWfxVlc/d5ETKdl5RMuco3y0pos3Boz83ZUlXyGgfZeSUAh1oopf+xdterfc2E9S6GUdfY0yrwwpah0BxBAze6Bwk4kfPNJnH5Vvew8f8S3uLhXIIV7loyxzdf+XVd1eXyeMU61BI32X2Ft81wZI116LzirloUsUju7E1DZZTMHSDzqkZezOwGUDkFZZxPDrNcZnU1kEcxpXtXaaxNeWWGFvhf1QYPegu9J9bxWAvz5ZimlW8qOnCxgYBdr75jXAidwIDAQAB”,”release_track”:”stable-channel”,”setup_state”:11,”signal_level”:-46,”ssdp_udn”:”63023a09-fa02-e49e-9289-6edd183146f1″,”ssid”:”myssid”,”timezone”:”America/New_York”,”uma_client_id”:”C23C5542-B402-A470-FBD2-C0E8701D4E6B”,”uptime”:3284.05,”version”:4,”wpa_configured”:false,”wpa_id”:0,”wpa_state”:1}

I’ve verified that that lat/long is exactly where I live. EXACTLY. Very creepy.

Next we see some more data about the public key to use:

{“build_version”:”12072″,”connected”:false,”has_update”:false,”hdmi_control”:true,”hotspot_bssid”:”FA:8F:XX:XX:XX:XX”,”locale”:”en_US”,”mac_address”:”D0:E7:XX:XX:XX:XX”,”name”:”Chromecast8991″,”opt_in”:{“crash”:true,”device_id”:false,”stats”:true},”public_key”:”MIIBCgKCAQEAyoaWlKNT6W5+/cJXEpIfeGvogtJ1DghEUs2PmHkX3n4bByfmMRDYjuhcb97vd8N3HFe5sld6QSc+FJz7TSGp/700e6nrkbGj9abwvobey/IrLbHTPLtPy/ceUnwmAXczkhay32auKTaM5ZYjwcHZkaU9XuOQVIPpyLF1yQerFChugCpQ+bvIoJnTkoZAuV1A1Vp4qf3nn4Ll9Bi0R4HJrGNmOKUEjKP7H1aCLSqj13FgJ2s2g20CCD8307Otq8n5fR+9/c01dtKgQacupysA+4LVyk4npFn5cXlzkkNPadcKskARtb9COTP2jBWcowDwjKSBokAgi/es/5gDhZm4dwIDAQAB”,”release_track”:”stable-channel”,”setup_state”:11,”sign”:{“certificate”:”—–BEGIN CERTIFICATE—–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\nc+WK9DlJnI9bLy46qYRVbzhhDJUkfZVtDKiUbvz3bg==\n—–END CERTIFICATE—–\n”,”nonce”:”Aw4o0/sbVr537Kdrw9YotiXxCLIaiRrDkHeHrOpih3U=”,”signed_data”:”fcTwn3K4I/ccok1MeZ5/nkM0pI5v4SrTv3Q4ppOQtVL5ii3qitNo+NLhY+DM9zmnP6ndNMZbkyIEyMm7LjganoDoE+o0e0/r4TyGEGLxYlfWSzf+Z3cSdNe4+MyHx/7z02E0/3lLsOFuOEPSgR26JFtyhDLCJ9Y8Cpl3GZMUqm4toaTNaIbhNMR9Bwjkz4ozKXzFl9dF5FTU6N48KeUP/3CuYqgm04BVUGxg+DbBmTidRnZE4eGdt9ICJht9ArUNQDL2UdRYVY2sfgLmF29exTaSrVkBZb/MsbDxN5nYpF1uE7IhzJnT5yFM9pmUOIKKTfeVaLVLGgoWd+pjEbOv+Q==”},”ssdp_udn”:”82c5cb87-27b4-2a9a-d4e1-5811f2b1992c”,”ssid”:””,”uma_client_id”:”4DE23B6E-B2B0-7DBC-7BFB-F29D84AF87EF”,”uptime”:101.98,”version”:4,”wpa_configured”:false,”wpa_state”:3}GET /setup/eureka_info HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.255.249:8008

After this the device knows you are ready to configure it and returns the next bit of data which represents the results of a successful wireless scan of potential SSIDs to connect to:

[{“bssid”:”c8:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx”,”signal_level”:-41,”ssid”:”myssid”,”wpa_auth”:7,”wpa_cipher”:4},{“bssid”:”5c:0a:xx:xx:xx:xx”,”si
gnal_level”:-42,”ssid”:”myotherssid”,”wpa_auth”:7,”wpa_cipher”:4},{“bssid”:”30:46:xx:xx:xx:xx”,”signal_level”:-53,”ssid”:”Hooters”,”wpa_auth”:7,”wpa_cipher”:4},{“bssid”:”00:1d:xx:xx:xx:xx”,”signal_level”:-61,”ssid”:”neighborsssid”,”wpa_auth”:7,”wpa_cipher”:4},{“bssid”:”b8:9b:xx:xx:xx:xx”,”signal_level”:-64,”ssid”:”anotherRetardedNeighborSSID”,”wpa_auth”:7,”wpa_cipher”:4},{“bssid”:”06:27:xx:xx:xx:xx”,”signal_level”:-42,”ssid”:”free open wifi1″,”wpa_auth”:1,”wpa_cipher”:1},{“bssid”:”06:27:xx:xx:xx:xx”,”signal_level”:-44,”ssid”:”more free open wifi”,”wpa_auth”:1,”wpa_cipher”:1}]&,* cSc52{zerogoki7w,/y*&,* cSc563:T`;&,* cSc562zerogoki7w,/y*&,* cSc563:T`;zerogokiwwwwgooglecom

wifisetup

A fun thing to note is that I’ve opted for not sending any information but this is conveniently ignored and I am still opting in for submitting data when there is a crash and for stats. Anyway, you can see SSID signal levels and other information. At this point you configure the device to connect to a wifi network by telling it the SSID and password.

This looks like the following:

POST /setup/connect_wifi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.255.249:8008
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 450
Origin: https://cast.google.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/29.0.1547.57 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8

{“bssid”:”5c:0a:xx:xx:xx:xx”,”signal_level”:-42,”ssid”:”myotherssid”,”wpa_auth”:7,”wpa_cipher”:4,”enc_passwd”:”AKWQ1K76dYzBzd5XLCkieFepJq+jvWcDMzTWGud7U66iWpfHS5LN4hhzEEcCdrWGyRC2pw0FRbx6dXUILPr40Os2ysp7AYqIloazqc6JsKAP+aLVv9OW8UpJJTEQVbkgcJiuh9+tPLZrmnHTURWHpXlBuYSJkwZDkW8ywnTcg8+wnrRho6BtMtKyXvNH3QIJhk+nXKHxLh154aMdA9+N3R4ZfH+4SNHrFiHhILXPiBgVmsMCM64kEgNQTRNu3Fzasyfea6XVVaQdWRB2DZC+euapWM1G/Pr9dXz1MraUc2tlEaO1LvDoDmy+08+k/ATwuOQO0DjIExsrEcHQIVXfPY=”}HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
Cache-Control: no-cache
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://cast.google.com
Content-Length: 0

At this point you can see that the request to connect uses the URL /setup/connect_wifi and is encrypted with the public key of the router (thankfully). You can see the target SSID/BSSID cipher type and password in the request.

It is at this point that the on screen display says: Connecting to “myssid” and for me it sits there FOREVER and never connects. I even tried to connect to a router I setup 5 feet away and ended up with this being the furthest it would go.

chromecast_cant_connect

Obviously once I get this connected I’ll continue my review of this cool little device and more importantly see what kind of fun things we can discover by analyzing its network traffic. For example I don’t even see the 4 digit code used in the communication between the client and the device but who knows? Maybe it is used in some obscure way that I haven’t seen. Another interesting thing is that although you can see that the http traffic is local between you and the device, it is facilitated over a connection to the public internet URL (https://cast.google.com/chromecast/setup?np=manualsetup) that uses local IP links/requests. I havent’ even looked at the website/js that performs these actions yet but I’m sure it would be interesting as well. Especially since I’m sure it takes note of the various responses returned from your GPS enabled device.

All in all, very impressive for a $35 device. Its tiny and comes with a built in AP used for configuration. I look forward to checking out its actual functionality once successfully connected!

rcrypt 1.3

Added functionality:
– breaks certain automated analysis engines
– added polymorphism to various other existing functionlities

If you don’t know what rcrypt is check out the original post

md5 sum: 80cc3105b0f035daa0cd19e85bc7c379
sha1 sum: 345fb729fcda1ef5bf004869abc1634092685718

download rcrypt

archive pw: 0xrage.com

rcrypt version 1.2 is now released!

rcrypt is a Windows PE binary crypter (a type of packer) that makes use of timelock techniques to cause a delay in execution. This delay can cause analysis to fail on time constrained systems such as on disk scanners. rcrypt can pack exes and dll files. PEs that use tls or other interesting features of the PE spec are not currently supported. I may add support for more spec features as time permits. In version 1.0 and 1.1 your funky active X and COM files will not work. If there is enough interest I will consider adding other features/support.

rcrypt features include:

encryption of all code/data

timelock puzzle

This is just a proof of concept tool to showcase the potential use of these techniques as well as potential shortcomings of various detection systems.

rcrypt is being released for educational purposes. I do not condone malicious or illegal use of this tool. Using this tool might also cause you to experience light headedness or fatigue. I also take no responsibility for any of these potential outcomes. Use your own discretion.

rcrypt 1.2

Minor re-addition of some internal functionality that was removed from versions 1.0 and 1.1 due to issues with windows xp/7 and 32/64 bit. Issues resolved and 1.2 is now out.

File MD5 sum: 1c0989a751038a49052a4e37f8879f43

File SHA1 sum: 4c22b51e466fd2516c68c94c2dd5f4dbf1bc395b

rcrypt v1.2 (File archive password: 0xrage.com)

 

rcrypt 1.1

Added in rcrypt version 1.1 is the optional switch -trick0. Read the readme for details.

File MD5 sum: 6c53c7d7dc6b342174b1eda13597c771

File SHA1 sum: 30f6fbf6c615269b6c894f7eec125a03c4cd5afd

rcrypt 1.1 (File archive password: 0xrage.com)